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Abstract 
Recently there has been increased interest in decisions-from-experience (where decision 
makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable 
insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily 
decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while 
such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant 
observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this 
assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose 
repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option 
and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not 
supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, 
(in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, 
and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only 
gains as opposed to losses, or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this 
variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness 
(inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches 
to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking 
in investigations of decisions-from-experience, providing novel insight into cognitive 
processes underlying them. 
 
Keywords: Decisions from experience; risky choice; eye tracking; attention; foregone 
outcomes; loss aversion 
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 Risk preferences are typically investigated by examining choices among monetary 
gambles. Until recently, however, these investigations have primarily examined choices 
between options where each option’s outcomes and probabilities were stated (Glöckner & 
Pachur, 2012; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Rieskamp, 2008; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). While 
investigations of these decisions-from-description have proved fruitful, one might question 
the generality of their findings given that many decisions under risk are based either on our 
own prior experiences (e.g., different routes to work), or on the experiences of others (e.g., 
movie reviews). The decisions-from-experience paradigms, which require decisions to be 
made based on past observations (Erev et al., 2010), have sought to address this oversight; 
providing novel insights into the cognitive processes involved in many everyday decisions 
(Rakow & Newell, 2010).  
 In one decisions-from-experience paradigm – decisions-from-feedback – individuals 
make repeated consequential choices between non-described options (i.e., without prior 
information about the payoff distributions), and see the outcome that occurred following each 
decision (Barron & Erev, 2003). In the “full feedback” variant (used in this paper) individuals 
also see the outcome of the non-selected option (i.e., the foregone payoff; Ert & Erev, 2008; 
Grosskopf, Erev, & Yechiam, 2006; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006). Commonly, each option 
delivers monetary payoffs that are drawn from a pre-determined distribution, allowing for 
direct comparison to decisions-from-description. One finding arising from such comparisons 
is that small probabilities appear to be underweighted in experience-based choice (Barron & 
Erev, 2003) – not over-weighted, as is typical in decisions-from-description (Gonzalez & Wu, 
1999; Prelec, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Given this divergence between decisions-
from-experience and those from description, researchers have sought to understand how 
people use experience to inform their choices (Barron & Ursino, 2013; Dutt & Gonzalez, 
2012; Erev et al., 2010; Lejarraga, Hertwig, & Gonzalez, 2012).  
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 One profitable route to understanding the cognitive processes involved in decisions-
from-experience has been via formal process models, which attempt to capture how previous 
outcomes are used to inform preferences (for an overview of such models, see Erev et al., 
2010). Many of the more successful models posit that individuals integrate, or store, each new 
piece of information (i.e., each outcome observed) then use that information to compute 
which option is superior (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). Some of these models also allow for sequence-order effects whereby 
information is weighted depending on when it was encountered (e.g., because this affects the 
probability of recall at a later time-point; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006). These 
models can account for behavior in decisions-from-experience; however, many of their 
formulations make untested assumptions about the decision maker’s cognitive processes that 
may not hold. 
 One implicit assumption underlying the majority of models for decisions-from-
experience (and for other experiential learning tasks) is that individuals are vigilant, paying 
attention to each outcome that occurs, and then storing or aggregating that information on 
each successive choice (Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Hau et al., 2008; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). Unfortunately, this critical assumption is – to our knowledge – 
untested. There are, however, several reasons why such an assumption might not hold. First, 
the assumption of constant vigilance neglects the cost-benefit trade-off inherent in acquiring 
information: while attending to each outcome allows for a clearer estimation of each option’s 
expected value (EV), that improvement in accuracy incurs costs of spent time and effort. 
Given that for non-dynamic options very little is gained by integrating additional outcomes 
beyond a given point, one might expect vigilance to decrease because there is diminishing 
marginal benefit for additional observations. Thus, when the costs of vigilance outweigh its 
benefits, a rational decision maker should decrease the level of attention they allocate to the 
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task (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Orquin, Bagger, & Muller-Loose, 2013).1 Second, 
research examining decisions-from-samples (another decisions-from-experience paradigm, in 
which participants observe “for free” before making a one-shot consequential choice) has 
found that individuals generally make very few observations before making their final 
decisions: often fewer than 10 (Hertwig et al., 2004; Lejarraga et al., 2012; Rakow, Demes, & 
Newell, 2008; Weber et al., 2004). Thus, even when free to seek out as much information as 
they wish, individuals seem content to rely on small numbers of observations (Hills & 
Hertwig, 2010). Given this, one might expect that in repeated-choice tasks where participants 
may make hundreds of repeated decisions, individuals might – having already determined 
their preferred option – reduce vigilance in later trials and opt to complete the task more 
quickly by selecting the option that provided the best return in an initial small sample of 
choices for most of the remaining trials.  
 There are other assumptions about the role of attention that are implicit in models of 
decisions-from-experience; specifically, either: a) each outcome is attended to and processed 
equally, or b) the amount of attention received is irrelevant. Thus, most models of experiential 
choice assume that choices are independent of attentional processes. For instance, a 
reinforcement-learning model developed by Sutton and Barto (1988) assumes that, as each 
choice is made, the resulting outcomes are integrated into the constructed values of each 
option. This model, however, does not consider the level of attention paid to each option, or 
outcome. This is at odds with a large literature suggesting that biases in directed visual 
attention can directly impact valuation and choice. For example, valuations are higher when 
more attention is paid to higher outcomes (Ashby, Dickert, & Glöckner, 2012), and increasing 
attention to an option has been shown to increase the propensity of selecting it (Krajbich, 
                                                     
1 Peterson and Beach (1967) expressed this normative principle succinctly: “Sample another datum if its cost is 
less than the expected increase in payoff from the information it will provide” (p. 37). In decisions-from-
experience the cost of each additional datum is relatively constant, whereas the added value of each additional 
datum diminishes with increasing sample size. At some point, the marginal value of additional data will fall 
below its cost.   
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Armel, & Rangel, 2010), or rating it more favorably (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 
2003).2 One might therefore expect that, just as in decisions-from-description, attentional 
allocation might also impact choices in decisions-from-experience. For instance, from an 
evidence accumulation perspective, increased focus on a foregone option (having only 
positive outcomes) would lead to more evidence speaking in its favor, which could result in a 
switch to that option on a subsequent choice (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) 
 One way to test assumptions of vigilance and attentional independence is via eye 
tracking as it allows for direct insight into what information is attended to (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011; Russo, 2011). Eye tracking methodologies have been used successfully to 
test assumptions of decision models, and to identify ways to improve them (Ashby et al., 
2012; Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). For example, Fiedler and Glöckner (2012) provided 
support for the assumption made by Decision Field Theory (DFT; Busemeyer & Townsend, 
1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001) that information sampling varies with the 
probability of an outcome occurring. Additionally, they found that the magnitude of the 
outcome predicted information sampling; suggesting how DFT might be reformulated and 
improved. Eye tracking has also been use to explore differences between decisions-from-
description and those from experience: Glöckner, Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal and Hilbig (2012) 
found that experiential choices were best explained by evidence accumulation processes.  
 In the current studies we employ eye tracking to measure directed visual attention (a 
proxy for information processing; Just & Carpenter, 1980) and test the assumptions of 
vigilance and independence of attention. First, we predict that the strong vigilance assumption 
will not hold3, and that over time vigilance will decrease further as the incremental reward for 
maintaining it (i.e., increased precision in estimates of value) diminishes: 
                                                     
2 For an alternative account see Orquin and Mueller Loose (2013). 
3 Such inattention to outcomes is distinct from ignoring cues when choosing – something which it has long been 
known to occur (Payne, 1976) 
EYES ON THE PRIZE?  7 
 
H1: Not all outcomes will be attended to and vigilance will decrease with experience. 
Second, we predict that attentional allocation will have a direct impact on choice, with 
a greater focus on “what could have been” increasing the propensity to switch options: 
H2a: The larger the proportion of attention directed towards the foregone outcome the more 
likely a switch (i.e., selecting a different option) will occur on the following choice. 
We also predict that the information being attended to will moderate the influence of 
attention, with increased attention to foregone outcomes which are higher than obtained 
outcomes further increasing the likelihood of making a switch; a chasing or win-stay lose-shift 
strategy (Biele, Erev, & Ert, 2009; Ert & Erev, 2007): 
H2b: The effect of attention to foregone outcomes on switching will be greatest when the 
foregone outcome exceeds one’s obtained outcome. 
Study 1: Testing the constant vigilance assumption 
Methods 
Participants. Fifty-one participants (Mage: 21.08; 57% female) received either course 
credit, or £6.00, for their participation and were entered in a lottery to have all their decisions 
incentivized, with possible earnings exceeding £150.00. 
Materials & Equipment. The 14 choice sets each consisted of pairs of gambles with 
each gamble having two possible outcomes (Table 1). Four of the gamble pairs were from 
Holt and Laury (2002) with two pairs each over gains and losses; six were from Hertwig et al. 
(2006); and four gamble pairs contained mixed outcomes (both losses and gains were 
possible). Outcomes were presented on a 22’ HD LCD monitor with a resolution of 1680 x 
1050, attenuating approximately 1.39° x 0.45° of visual angle; outcomes were presented 0.69° 
of visual angle left and right of the horizontal center and were approximately 9.53° of visual 
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angle above and below the monitor’s midpoint (Figure 1b). Eye movements were recorded 
using a SMI RED250 binocular eye tracking system with an accuracy of 0.45° of visual angle.  
Table 1 
Procedure. Participants were calibrated to the eye tracker using 9 points; calibration 
was accepted if the amount of error was less than 1° of visual angle. Participants read 
instructions from the screen informing them that they would make repeated choices between 
different pairs of options and that one participant would be selected from the project and 
receive the accumulated earnings from all their choices. Participants were informed that on 
each choice they would see the outcome both for the option they picked (obtained outcome) 
and for the other unpicked option (foregone outcome). Options were presented on the left and 
right side of the screen (option location randomly determined for each choice set) and were 
labeled “LEFT OPTION” and “RIGHT OPTION” (see Figure 1a). After any questions were 
answered, participants choose between each pair 40 times at their own pace by clicking the 
left (right) mouse-button to select the left (right) option. Following each choice, outcomes 
(obtained and foregone) were presented on the top and bottom of the screen with the location 
of each being counterbalanced between participants; participants were told that the outcomes 
would be displayed in these locations. Participants could view the outcomes of their previous 
choice for as long as they wished, and then pushed the space bar to move to their next choice. 
This procedure (for making choices and displaying outcomes) was used in order to separate 
eye movements related to information search from those related to choice; ensuring that if a 
participant is found to fixate on an outcome it is not an artifact resulting from orienting 
towards that option to select it. After completing all choices across all option pairs 
participants were debriefed and paid. 
Data Preparation. We defined our areas of interest (AOIs) to allow for a 5° visual 
angle border around each outcome (outlines in Figure 1b); AOIs took into account both the 
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outcomes themselves and leading symbols (the currency-symbol and minus-sign). This large 
region – five times the minimum calibration accuracy – was selected to ensure that we 
captured all fixations to an outcome even if such fixations relied on peripheral perceptual 
processing (parafoveal fixations). This large AOI definition increases the number of false 
positive fixations (classifying a fixation as belonging to an AOI when it was not); therefore, 
the vigilance rates that we report likely overestimate the true rates of vigilance. Fixations were 
defined as continuous gaze within, or outside, one of our AOIs. As per convention, we 
excluded fixations lasting less than 50ms (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1 a 
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Figure 1b 
 
Results 
The Vigilance Assumption. To test H1 we collapsed across choices and option pairs, 
to compute the rate of inattention for each participant (the percentage of occasions they 
observed neither the obtained nor the foregone outcome following a choice). The mean rate of 
inattention was 5% (95% CI [.021, .073]); therefore, the strict vigilance assumption cannot be 
sustained. This inattention rate varied greatly between individuals, ranging from 0% (constant 
vigilance) to 42%. We also tested whether there was a difference in how obtained and 
foregone outcomes were attended to by comparing the average inattention rates for obtained 
and foregone outcomes (separately). We find that inattention was significantly greater for 
foregone outcomes (31%) than for obtained outcomes (11%), t(50) = -4.58, p < .001; perhaps 
indicating that participants assigned differential importance to each outcome type. 
 To test whether inattention increased as more choices were made we performed a 
multi-level logit regression predicting whether both outcomes were observed (coded 0) or 
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whether only one, or neither, outcome was observed (coded 1), by choice number (choices 
one through 40) on Level 1, and participant on Level 2 (Nezlek, Schröder-Abe, & Schütz, 
2006). We find inattention increased as more choices were made in a given choice set, b = 
.02, z = 5.51, p < .001 (Figure 2 upper left panel).  
 Given that losses often loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) vigilance 
should be greater (i.e., less inattention) when outcomes involve potential losses (Yechiam & 
Hochman, 2013). One might also expect the outcome makeup of an option pair to influence 
vigilance because the comparison between positive and negative outcomes (in mixed-outcome 
gamble pairs) should amplify feelings of regret and rejoicing (Bell, 1982). Furthermore, given 
that decision times increase when options have similar EVs (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) 
vigilance should increase as options’ values become similar. Lastly, because higher variance 
in outcomes leads to greater exploration (Lejarraga et al., 2012), one might expect higher 
vigilance rates for option pairs containing more outcome variance. Therefore, we examined 
whether these effects were present by performing analysis as above but including dummy 
variables for frame (coded 1 if all outcomes were losses, 0 otherwise), the outcome makeup of 
an option pair (coded 0 if all outcomes were either gains or losses, 1 for mixed), the absolute 
difference in EVs between the two options (abs|EV1 – EV2|), and the SD of the option pair 
(over both options’ outcomes). Counter to expectation (outlined above), frame was not a 
significant predictor, p = .95; nor was the effect of absolute EV-difference, p = .49, suggesting 
that vigilance was not influenced by the relative superiority of one option over the other. The 
effect of SD also failed to reach significance, p = .48. Outcome makeup was found to be a 
significant predictor, b = .55 z = 6.50, p < .001, with the rate of inattention being higher when 
options consisted of both gains and losses (6%) rather than only gains or losses (4%). 
Performing similar analyses, but predicting vigilance to the obtained (Figure 2 lower 
left) and foregone (Figure 2 right panel) outcomes separately, we find that frame is a 
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significant predictor for obtained outcomes, with less attention being paid to outcomes 
involving only losses, p < .001; an effect not found for foregone outcomes, p = .87. Outcome 
makeup was a significant predictor for both, with inattention being greater for outcomes 
involving gains and losses, p’s < .001. The absolute EV-difference and SD did not 
significantly predict inattention to either outcome, p’s > .11.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 Given that we find overlap in what predicts vigilance to obtained and foregone 
outcomes, we investigated whether vigilance rates between the two were related. Performing 
a multi-level logit regression, predicting attention to the foregone outcome from attention to 
the obtained outcome (both coded 0 for not attended to, 1 for attended to) we find inattention 
to the foregone outcome was significantly higher when the obtained outcome was not 
attended to (44%) than when it was (29%), b = .57, z = 10.57, p < .001. Thus, if a participant 
didn’t observe one outcome they were more likely to not observe the other.  
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 Lastly, given that experiential choice has been found to become more normative with 
greater experience (i.e., showing a greater preference for higher EV options; Hills, Noguchi, 
& Gibbert, 2013) we examined whether decreased vigilance predicted the ability to pick the 
better (EV-maximizing) option. To do so we performed analysis as above, but predicted a 
choice for the better option in an option pair (coded 0 if the poorer option was picked, 1 if the 
better – higher EV - option was) by choice number and the proportion of choices within an 
option pair in which both obtained and foregone outcome information was not attended (i.e., 
the rate of inattention). We also include the option pairs SD, as increased outcome variability 
is often associated with decreased selection of the better option (pay-off variability effect; 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Myers & Sadler, 1960). As anticipated, we find that the 
probability of choosing the better option increased with experience (49% in the first choice to 
54% in the last), b = .006, z = 5.11, p < .001; and observe a pay-off variability effect, with 
increased variability in outcomes reducing the likelihood of picking the better option, b = -
.19, z = -38.49, p < .001. As expected increased inattention (lower vigilance) decreased EV-
maximization, b = -.29, z = -2.86, p = .004.  
Attentional Independence Assumption To test H2a/2b, (that the distribution of 
attention impacts choice) we performed analysis as above, but predicting a switch (coded 0 if 
the same option was selected on the previous choice, 1 if the other option was chosen) by the 
difference in the previously observed outcomes (previous obtained outcome minus previous 
foregone outcome), choice number, and the proportion of time spent attending to the foregone 
outcome (PF = total duration of gaze to foregone divided by the total duration of gaze to both 
outcomes), and the interaction between PF and the difference in previous outcomes (both 
centered). We find, as is often reported (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011), that as the number of 
choices made for a given gamble pair increases the likelihood of a switch occurring decreases 
b = -.006, z = -5.17, p < .001.The effect of outcome difference was significant, b = -.12, z = -
20.08, p < .001, with the likelihood of switching decreasing the larger one’s obtained outcome 
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was relative to the foregone outcome. In support of H2a we find that attention predicts choice 
with increased PF leading to a significant increase in the likelihood of making a switch, b = 
.33, z = 5.70, p < .001. In line with H2b the interaction between the difference in the previous 
outcomes and PF was marginally significant with the effect of attention to the foregone being 
reduced when the foregone outcome was smaller than the obtained outcome, b = -.04 z = -
1.80, p = .07. 
Discussion 
 In Study 1 we find that the standard assumptions regarding sustained vigilance in 
experiential decision tasks are not supported: at a conservative estimate, there is a 5% chance 
that neither outcome is attended to, a probability that increases to 11% and 31%, respectively, 
when examining the obtained and foregone outcomes alone. In addition, the rate of vigilance 
decreases as the number of choices made within a gamble pair increases. This suggests that 
after sufficient experience participants may adopt a less resource-intensive strategy to monitor 
and adjust their preferences. 
Interestingly, vigilance was lower when options had mixed outcomes or involved only 
losses (effects seen more clearly for obtained outcomes alone). At first blush, these findings 
run counter to loss aversion; losses should receive more attention than gains if they “matter 
more”. However, if losses do loom larger than gains then participants might choose not to 
attend to obtained outcomes to avoid the pain of experiencing losses, or might prefer not to 
see foregone outcomes to avoid experiencing regret (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 
1992). Regret aversion might also explain why vigilance rates were lower for foregone rather 
than obtained outcomes as participants might not have wanted to know that they could have 
done better. 
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  Regarding the impact of attention on choice, we find that increased attentional 
allocation to the foregone outcome (relative to the obtained outcome) predicts switching 
between options. The difference in the obtained and foregone outcome predicts a switch in 
line with a win-stay lose-shift strategy (Barraclough, Conroy, & Lee. 2004; Biele, Erev, & 
Ert, 2009), an effect amplified by attentional allocation. This suggests there are two 
independent, but interrelated, attentional influences on choice: what one attends to, and how 
long one attends to it. It therefore appears that directed attention itself might also impact 
experiential choice in line with recent research showing that options which receive more 
attention are preferred (Shimojo et al., 2003), or where evidence is weighted by the level of 
attention it receives (Milosavljevic, Malmaud, Huth, Koch, & Rangel, 2010; Rieskamp, 
2008). 
 While we find support for our prediction that common assumptions underlying models 
of experiential choice are not supported, there are two factors which may place limits on our 
conclusions. First, because incentivization only occurred for one (randomly selected) 
participant, a participant might be less motivated and vigilant if they felt that the odds of 
incentivization occurring for them were low. Second, having outcomes appear away from 
option labels might have decreased vigilance since attending to an outcome came at a cost of 
at least one eye movement. We therefore conducted a second study to investigate whether 
these factors influenced vigilance. 
Study 2: The influence of task structure on vigilance 
Method 
Participants. Forty participants (Mage = 25.25; 70% female) took part in Study 2. The 
payment schedule was a manipulation: half of the participants received £3.00 and 
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incentivization from each of their choices, while the other half received £5.00 and the chance 
of having all of their choices incentivized as in Study 1.  
Materials. We employed nine new gamble pairs, each option containing two possible 
outcomes (Table 2). Three of the pair’s outcomes consisted of gains, three contained a 
mixture of gains and losses, and three consisted of only loses. In each pair, one option had 
greater variance than the other and the option with more variance (i.e., the riskier option) was 
always the better (higher EV) option if EVs differed. Specifically, in one option pair in each 
domain (i.e., gains, mixed, or losses) the options had nearly identical EVs (Table 2; O-pairs 1, 
4, 7); in another there was about a £0.05 difference in EVs (O-pairs 2, 5, 8); while the last pair 
had a £0.09 difference in EVs between the two options (O-pairs 3, 6, 9). Study 2 used the 
same eye-tracking equipment and processing methods as Study 1. 
 
 
Table 3 
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Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 1 except for two key changes. First, 
half of the participants were informed that they would be incentivized for each of their 
choices; while the other half were informed that one (randomly selected) participant would 
have all their choices incentivized, as in Study 1. This split allows us to determine whether the 
type of incentivization affects vigilance. Second, for choices in five of the pairs, outcomes 
were presented directly under the options labels (as is typical for experiments that present 
both obtained and foregone payoffs; Ert & Erev, 2007; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006); while 
for four of the pairs the outcomes were presented at the top and bottom of the screen, as per 
Study 1. The assignment of option pairs to outcome display location was random and 
participants were informed before each trial began where each outcome would be displayed 
(e.g., foregone outcome on upper portion of screen). This manipulation was used to 
investigate the impact of outcome location on vigilance. The only other change was that 
participants made 50 choices within each pair. 
Results 
The Vigilance Assumption. We replicate the finding of Study 1 that the strict 
vigilance assumption is not supported, though the rate of inattention (i.e., failing to observe 
both outcomes) was only marginal (1%; 95% CI [-.002, .0197]); inattention rates ranged from 
0% to 19% across participants. Again, inattention to one of the outcomes was relatively 
common, and there was a significantly higher rate of inattention to foregone outcomes (19%) 
than obtained outcomes (12%), t(39) = -4.44, p < .001. Counter to Study 1, we find inattention 
to obtained outcomes was negatively related to vigilance to foregone outcomes, b = -1.94, z = 
-21.55, p < .001, with rates of inattention to the foregone outcome being higher when the 
obtained outcome was attended to (21%) than when it was not (8%). Thus, there appears to be 
an attentional trade-off, with vigilance to one outcome decreasing vigilance to the other. 
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To examine the impact of experience and task structure (incentivization and outcome 
locations) we performed analysis as in the previous study predicting whether both outcomes 
were observed (inattention; coded 0 if they were, 1 if they weren’t) by: choice number, frame, 
outcome makeup, a dummy coded variable for the difference in the options EVs (no 
difference coded as the base level), type of incentivization (coded 0 for incentivization by 
lottery, 1 if all choices were incentivized), and the position of the outcomes (coded 0 for 
outcomes displayed directly under labels, 1 for outcomes displayed on the top and bottom of 
the screen). Replicating the results of Study1, we find that the rate of inattention increases as 
more choice are made, b = .02, z = 2.86, p < .01. The effect of frame was significant with 
inattention for loss-only option pairs being higher than when some outcomes were positive, b 
= .74, z = 3.41, p = .001 (Figure 3. The effect of outcome makeup was not found to be 
significant, p = .89, nor was the type of incentivization, p = .69. The impact of outcome 
position was, however, significant, b = -.65, z = -3.30, p < .01 (see Figure 3 upper and lower 
left panels). In addition, EV-difference was found to be (marginally) significant with 
inattention decreasing if there was a difference in EVs, ps < .06; though the size of the EV-
difference among non-EV-equivalent option pairs did not significantly affect the rate of 
inattention, p = .44. 
We performed separate analyses for vigilance to the obtained (Figure 3 upper and 
lower panels second from the right) and to the foregone outcomes (Figure 3 upper and lower 
panels on the far right); which were otherwise identical to those described above. The findings 
closely matched the combined analyses; for brevity we only report those results which run 
counter to the combined analyses, and/or are different for obtained and foregone outcomes. 
First, frame was not a significant predictor for inattention to obtained outcomes, p = .13, 
while it was a significant predictor of increased inattention to foregone outcomes, b = .52, z = 
10.31, p < .001. Counter to the combined results, outcome makeup significantly predicted 
increased vigilance to the obtained outcome, with there being less inattention to obtained 
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outcomes involving mixed outcomes (9%) than only gains or losses (13%), b = -.37, z = -6.04, 
p < .001; outcome makeup was not a significant predictor of vigilance to foregone outcomes, 
p = .76. Interestingly, and counter to our expectations, the effect of outcome position was a 
significant negative predictor of inattention to obtained outcomes, b = -.15, z = -2.98, p < .01, 
with inattention decreasing when the obtained outcome was shown in the top and bottom 
(11%) format than when they appeared under each option’s label (12%). However, this effect 
reversed for vigilance to the foregone outcome with greater inattention for outcomes 
displayed on the top and bottom of the screen (25%) than under each option’s label (15%), b 
= .72, z = 17.20, p < .001. Regarding the EV-difference between options: for vigilance to the 
obtained outcome, only large EV-differences led to lower rates of inattention, b = -.39, z = -
6.18, p < .001. For foregone outcomes, the effect of EV-difference was more straightforward, 
with both moderate, b = -.33, z = -6.39, p < .001, and higher, b = -.23, z = -4.51, p < .001, EV-
differences between options decreasing inattention (relative to no difference). 
Figure 3 
Lastly, to examine the link between vigilance and EV-maximization, we predicted 
selection of the better (riskier) option (only for the six option pairs with a dominant option) 
by: choice number, the rate of inattention to both outcomes within the option pair, and EV-
difference as in the previous study. We replicate the finding that increased experience 
increases the likelihood of selecting the better option (48% in the first choice to 54% in the 
final choice), b = .006, z = 4.28, p < .001. As one would expect, the rate of inattention was 
found to be a significant negative predictor, b = -2.85, z = -4.35, p < .001: as in the previous 
study failing to attend to outcomes reduced the likelihood of choosing the better option. The 
effect of EV-difference was significant with the likelihood of selecting the better option being 
greater when EV differences were higher (54% vs. 48%), b =.21, z = 5.58, p < .001, even 
though payoff variability increased. 
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Attentional Independence Assumption. As in Study 1, we tested whether attention 
impacts choice (H2a-b) by predicting a switch from: the difference in previous outcomes, 
choice number, as well as PF, and its interaction with the difference in the previous outcomes. 
Counter to Study 1, choice number was not a significant predictor, p = .26. However, as per 
Study 1, the larger the obtained outcome (relative to the foregone outcome) the lower the 
likelihood of a switch, b = -1.31, z = -27.78, p < .001. Again, and in line with our predictions, 
the effect of PF was significant, b = .29, z = 4.73, p < .001, with increased focus on the 
foregone outcome increasing the likelihood of switching. Lastly, the interaction between the 
difference in previous outcomes and PF was marginally significant, b = .31, z = 1.95, p = .05. 
Though the effect is opposite in direction to H2b and the results of the previous study, with the 
effect of greater obtained outcomes on the likelihood of switching being reduced when more 
attention was directed to the foregone outcome. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicates the key effects present in Study 1, and provides further insight into 
factors that influence vigilance. We find that strong vigilance assumptions are not supported: 
often only the obtained or foregone outcome was attended to, and inattention increased with 
experience (i.e., as more choices were made, and outcomes observed). In addition, outcome 
position predicted attention: when outcomes were shown under labels instead of at the top 
(bottom) of the screen – thus requiring a quick eye-movement – vigilance to foregone 
outcomes decreased, while there was a slight increase in vigilance to obtained outcomes. We 
also find that EV-differences between options influenced vigilance: foregone outcomes were 
attended to less when options had equivalent EVs than when one option had higher EV. 
 As in Study 1, increased attention to the foregone outcome increased the probability of 
switching to a different option on the next choice, even when taking into account differences 
between the obtained and foregone outcome. Counter to our predictions, an increased focus 
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on the foregone outcome actually decreased the negative impact of greater obtained outcomes 
on switching. This provides further evidence against this effect being due to the amplification 
of regret, or increasing the use of a win-stay lose-shift strategy. 
General Discussion 
 In two eye-tracking studies, we find that decision makers are not consistently vigilant 
observers in repeated choice tasks; frequently, either the obtained or the foregone outcome is 
not attended to – and, occasionally, neither outcome is processed. This is an important finding 
since many theories of experiential choice assume that each outcome is attended to and is 
either integrated immediately to update the subjective value of each option or encoded in 
memory for later retrieval (Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Hertwig et al., 2006; Sutton & Barto, 
1998; Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011). Moreover, we demonstrate that the level of vigilance varies 
predictably: decision makers are more likely to attend to obtained than to foregone outcomes, 
and attentiveness is influenced by the makeup of the options and other aspects of the choice 
task (e.g., the display). Furthermore, we find that attentional allocation predicts subsequent 
choices, with an increased focus on foregone outcomes increasing the likelihood that the other 
option is picked on the next choice. Together, these findings suggest that current models of 
repeated experiential choice would benefit from revision – and provide some insight into how 
to implement such revisions.4 
Re-thinking the vigilance assumption in process models of experiential choice  
The current findings, when combined with previous research in decisions-from-
samples paradigms, which indicate that choices are generally made after relatively few 
samples (Weber et al., 2004; Hills & Hertwig, 2010), suggest that frugal information uptake 
                                                     
4 Four key findings summarized in this paragraph were replicated in a third eye-tracking study (N = 31) using 
four new choice sets (not reported for the sake of brevity). Specifically, vigilance was (1) greater for obtained 
than for forgone outcomes, (2) decreased for either outcome type as more choices were made, and (3) was lower 
for loss-only choice sets; also, (4) switches were more likely following increased attention to forgone outcomes.  
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may be the norm in decisions-from-experience. For example, the relatively great speed at 
which an individual’s choices become stable suggest that initial observations carry 
considerable weight (perhaps largely because – as found here – they are more likely to be 
attended to than later observations). Later choices would then usually fall in line with 
preferences formed from these initial observations, unless the decision maker perceives a (real 
or illusory) change in the environment, or believes that they have identified a pattern in the 
outcomes that warrants frequent switching (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Wolford, Newman, 
Miller & Wig, 2004). Note that because vigilance decreases over time we should expect 
preferences to update increasingly slowly as more information becomes available – even 
when such changes in preference are advantageous. This is exactly what is observed in 
repeated choice tasks when an unannounced change in the option payoff distributions alters 
which of two options is best: participants are quick to select the initially superior option, but 
slow to alter that preference to favor an equally superior option when the environment 
changes (Gaissmaier, Schooler & Rieskamp, 2006; Rakow & Miler, 2010).  
Diminishing vigilance over time may also explain an intriguing finding from the 
decisions-from-samples literature. Recency (greater influence of later observations) is often 
observed when participants choose themselves how much information to collect before 
making a one-shot decision (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004), but not when the experimenter 
determines how many pre-decisional observations are permitted (Rakow et al., 2008; 
Ungemach, Chater & Stewart, 2009). Presumably, reduced vigilance to outcomes is more 
acute when one cannot opt to stem the flow of outcomes to be viewed; therefore, if 
participants who are forced to sample simply reduce their vigilance to later outcomes this will 
counteract recency (because later outcomes are simply not attended to). 
 Importantly, while our participants did not maintain perfect vigilance, they attended to 
at least one outcome (obtained or foregone) in 95% of choices. It might, therefore, be argued 
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that vigilance is actually quite high. However, our analyses were deliberately liberal in 
classifying fixations (e.g., including a 50ms fixation 5° of visual angle away from the edge of 
an outcome) to ensure that anything that might represent a fixation was included. To illustrate, 
had we instead used a standard cutoff for detecting fixations of 1° of visual angle in Study 1 
the rate of vigilance would have been much lower (34% of the time neither outcome would 
have been viewed); thus, it is likely that the true rate of vigilance is substantially lower than 
reported here. 
 One reason why inattention is noteworthy is that it prompts us to re-interpret current 
models of repeated choice. For instance, value-updating models often include a parameter that 
reflects imperfect integration of new information, due to inertia or noise (e.g., Busemeyer & 
Townsend, 1993). While unlikely to be the full story, our data provide an explanation for 
imperfect value updating: updating based on prior outcomes cannot be perfect if some 
outcomes are not observed. Memory-based sampling models often have a parameter reflecting 
the probability that a given (prior) outcome is retrieved when a subsequent choice is made 
(e.g., Dutt & Gonzalez, 2012). Our data suggest that such parameters may be better 
understood to reflect both the probability that an outcome is attended to and the probability 
that the outcome is stored and retrieved given that is was observed. Additionally, our data 
should prompt researchers to look beyond simply re-interpreting the components of existing 
models along the lines discussed here. This is because our data show that vigilance is partly 
predictable from features of the decision task or choice environment; therefore, adding 
components to models that reflect variation in vigilance as a function of those features (e.g., 
the presence of losses) may improve those models.  
The predictors, and implications, of (in)vigilance 
Our data reveal multiple influences on the level of vigilance to outcomes in repeated 
choice. First, vigilance to foregone outcomes is lower than vigilance to obtained outcomes. 
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Second, losses, or combinations of losses and gains, are less frequently attended to than gains. 
Third, this negative effect of losses on vigilance is, on average, greater for foregone 
outcomes. Combined, these results might suggest that participants were attempting to 
minimize feelings of regret by choosing not to process outcomes that might induce such 
emotions. While sticking one’s head in the proverbial sand might seem unwise, it could have 
benefits. Failing to observe that one could have earned more (or lost less) can only decrease 
regret as there is no input to generate it; while not attending to the foregone could help 
insulate against potentially maladaptive behavior such as chasing misleading wins (Barber, 
Odean, & Zheng, 2001; Grosskopf et al., 2006; Barraclough et al., 2004; Ert & Erev, 2007). 
 Formal models that allow for the differential weighting of obtained and foregone 
outcomes (Yechiam & Rakow, 2012; Camerer & Ho, 1999) provide one framework for 
modeling the decreased vigilance to foregone outcomes that we observed. However, these 
models implement differential weighting by discounting the weight given to foregone 
outcomes in the decision process, which, while it might fit the data, does not necessarily 
reflect the greater inattention to foregone outcomes that we observed. An approach more in 
line with our data would be to include a model parameter which provides some probability of 
the foregone and obtained outcomes being processed. As such, we suggest that future research 
should more carefully examine what is driving this diminished attention to foregone outcomes 
and potential losses as such investigations could provide important insight into the cognitive 
and affective processes involved in experiential learning and a greater understanding of robust 
phenomena such as loss aversion and adaptation in changing environments. 
The consequences of variation in attentional allocation  
 In addition to identifying some influences on the degree of vigilance in decisions-
from-feedback, our data also suggest that this attentional allocation plays an important role in 
experiential choice. Specifically, we consistently find that the greater the proportion of 
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attention directed at the foregone outcome, the higher the likelihood that a switch is made on 
the following choice; an effect which was present even when the value of the outcome being 
observed was taken into account. This is important as it suggests that experiential choice, just 
like described choice (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012) and valuation (Ashby et al., 2012), is likely 
influenced by attention-weighted evidence accumulation processes (Busemeyer & Townsend, 
2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Thus, not only are outcomes weighted based on their 
frequency of occurrence, but also by the amount of attention they receive. Importantly, this 
implies that the fit, or generalizability, of models could be improved by including components 
that reflect attentional processes. Our studies illustrate two strategies for achieving this. First, 
as we have done, one can use process data from eye tracking (as a proxy for the attention 
allocated to each datum) as a model input. Second, one can determine what influences the 
allocation of attention, and use that to inform what parameters or characteristics are included 
in a model. For example, we observed that attention diminished as more choices were made. 
For a value-updating model, this implies diminishing sensitivity to new information; while, 
for a model of sampling from memory, it implies that, ceteris paribus, initial observations 
have an elevated probability of recall because they are more likely to be attended to. 
Process models of decisions from experience – next steps  
 Our findings challenge some of the standard assumptions of current models by 
showing: that decision makers do not always maintain vigilance; that not all types of 
outcomes are treated the same; and that attentional allocation predicts experiential choice. 
However, this does not imply that the processes instantiated in current models of experiential 
choice, such as sequential value updating (Hertwig et al., 2004) or memory retrieval processes 
(Ashby & Rakow, 2014; Gonzalez, Dutt, & Lebiere, 2013) are spurious. Rather, we argue that 
we have identified additional components of information acquisition and attention that could 
usefully be incorporated into such models. Having shown that eye tracking can provide 
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insights into preference construction processes, we urge cognitive researchers to utilize eye-
tracking and other process data to further improve and test theory.   
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Table 1. Probabilities (P1-4) and outcomes (O1-4) for each option in each option pair (O-Pair) 
and their expected values (EV1-2), as well as the average maximization rates (MR) and 
vigilance rates (VR) in Study 1; sorted by domain: gains only (O-Pairs 1 – 6), mixed 
outcomes (O-Pairs 7- 10), and losses only (O-Pairs 11 – 14) 
O-
Pair 
P1 O1 P2 O2 EV1 P3 O3 P4 O4 EV2 MR VR 
1 0.8 £2.00 0.2 £1.60 £1.92 0.8 £3.85 0.2 £0.10 £3.10 67% 96% 
2 0.5 £2.00 0.5 £1.60 £1.80 0.5 £3.85 0.5 £0.10 £1.98 51% 97% 
3 0.8 £2.00 0.2 £0.00 £1.60 1 £1.50 0 £0.00 £1.50 63% 94% 
4 0.1 £16.00 0.9 £0.00 £1.60 1 £1.50 0 £0.00 £1.50 33% 97% 
5 0.2 £2.00 0.8 £0.00 £0.40 0.25 £1.50 0.75 £0.00 £0.38 54% 95% 
6 0.03 £16.00 0.97 £0.00 £0.40 0.25 £1.50 0.75 £0.00 £0.38 36% 94% 
7 0.7 £1.50 0.3 £-1.50 £0.60 0.9 £1.50 0.1 £-1.50 £1.20 62% 95% 
8 0.5 £1.80 0.5 £-1.80 £0.00 0.74 £1.80 0.26 £-1.80 £0.87 59% 95% 
9 0.26 £1.80 0.74 £-1.80 £-0.87 0.5 £1.80 0.5 £-1.80 £0.00 58% 94% 
10 0.1 £1.50 0.9 £-1.50 £-1.20 0.3 £1.50 0.7 £-1.50 £-0.60 62% 92% 
11 1 £-1.50 0 £0.00 £-1.50 0.1 £-16.00 0.9 £0.00 £-1.60 27% 95% 
12 1 £-1.50 0 £0.00 £-1.50 0.8 £-2.00 0.2 £0.00 £-1.60 65% 94% 
13 0.5 £-2.00 0.5 £-1.60 £-1.80 0.5 £-3.85 0.5 £-0.10 £-1.98 56% 99% 
14 0.8 £-2.00 0.2 £-1.60 £-1.92 0.8 £-3.85 0.2 £-0.10 £-3.10 72% 96% 
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Table 2. Probabilities (P1-4) and outcomes (O1-4) for each option in each option pair (O-Pair) 
and their expected values (EV1-2), as well as the average maximization rates (MR; - denotes 
when there was no EV dominant option) and vigilance rates (VR) in Study 2; sorted by 
domain: gains only (O-Pairs 1 – 3), mixed outcomes (O-Pairs 4- 6), and losses only (O-Pairs 7 
– 9). 
O-
Pair 
P1 O1 P2 O2 EV1 P3 O3 P4 O4 EV2 MR VR 
1 0.4 £0.10 0.6 £0.08 £0.09 0.21 £0.31 0.79 £0.03 £0.09 - 99% 
2 0.4 £0.15 0.6 £0.13 £0.14 0.21 £0.70 0.79 £0.05 £0.19 42% 99% 
3 0.4 £0.09 0.6 £0.17 £0.08 0.21 £0.74 0.79 £0.01 £0.16 45% 99% 
4 0.4 £0.15 0.6 £-0.06 £0.02 0.21 £0.38 0.79 £-0.07 £0.02 - 99% 
5 0.4 £0.13 0.6 £-0.02 £0.04 0.21 £0.69 0.79 £-0.08 £0.08 39% 99% 
6 0.4 £0.11 0.6 £-0.05 £0.01 0.21 £0.85 0.79 £-0.10 £0.10 44% 99% 
7 0.4 £-0.22 0.6 £-0.09 £-0.14 0.21 £-0.57 0.79 £-0.03 £-0.14 - 98% 
8 0.4 £-0.39 0.6 £-0.10 £-0.22 0.21 £-0.77 0.79 £-0.01 £-0.17 67% 99% 
9 0.4 £-0.44 0.6 £-0.18 £-0.28 0.21 £-0.87 0.79 £-0.02 £-0.20 74% 99% 
 
